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INVISIBLE ACTORS: GENETIC TESTING AND GENETIC
DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE
Susannah Carr*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2005, Wal-Mart executives, attempting simultaneously to
respond to criticism about stingy health coverage for employees and to con-
tain costs, recommended that the company recruit a "healthier, more produc-
tive work force."' As people's deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) becomes more
closely linked with health and the ability to predict health, Wal-Mart's broad
recommendation could be the harbinger of a clash between employers and
employees because these groups have diverging interests when it comes to
managing health information, particularly genetic information. Genetic in-
formation is knowledge of a person's genome that indicates a predisposition
towards an illness, disease, or medical condition, where symptoms of the
condition have yet to manifest themselves.2 As genetic testing enters the
mainstream, employees increasingly fear genetic discrimination-the use of
employees' genetic information to influence employment decisions.
Current federal and state law is inadequate to protect employees from
employers' misuse of their genetic information. Federal law protections are
insufficient, and relevant state laws vary in their scope and application. Not
only are employees unevenly protected across the United States, but varying
standards also make complying with the law difficult for interstate employ-
ers. To give employees sufficient protection and to facilitate employer com-
pliance, Congress should pass a law specifically addressing genetic discrim-
ination in the workplace. The law should have broad applicability, prohibit
employers from using workers' genetic information in employment deci-
sions, have limited exceptions for employers' requests for genetic informa-
tion, enhance employee privacy protections, and create a private right of
action. Congress is taking steps in the right direction. This year both the
House and the Senate reintroduced identical Genetic Information Nondi-
* Susannah Carr is a law clerk for the Honorable Anne L. Ellington, Washington State
Court of Appeals, Division I. She graduated Order of the Coif from the University of Wash-
ington School of Law in 2006.
1. Reed Abelson, Everyday High Health Cost; One Giant's Struggle Is Corporate
America's, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2005, at Cl.
2. The breadth of information offered by genetic analysis could change and expand as
scientific study progresses.
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scrimination Acts (hereinafter, the "Bill"). 3 This law provides employees
with more protection than many similar state laws, while sufficiently pro-
tecting employers from being penalized for collecting genetic information in
well-defined circumstances. To be complete, however, the Bill should ex-
tend its coverage to both licensing organizations and employers acting as
self-insurers.
II. EMPLOYEES NEED UNIFORM PROTECTIONS AGAINST GENETIC
DISCRIMINATION
To many managers, owners, and executives, obtaining genetic informa-
tion about their employees appears to be sensible business policy. Because
of their financial role in providing healthcare, employers have "a strong
economic incentive to screen out perceived future high cost" healthcare us-
ers.4 They want to maximize employees' fitness and productivity while mi-
nimizing employee absenteeism and turnover.' Hazardous workplaces, in
which employers have obligations to monitor the health of their workers and
may want to protect the health of those with a genetic predisposition for
disease by excluding them from the hazardous environment, heighten these
concerns. 6 Finally, some employers have a seemingly insatiable desire for
tests, submitting their employees to personality tests and handwriting ana-
lyses in an effort to predict employee performance.7
Employers have already started using genetic information in the
workplace. In 2004, the American Management Association found that
companies were genetically testing employees for risk of breast and colon
cancer, Huntington's disease, and susceptibility to workplace hazards.8 One
in six of the companies surveyed collected family medical histories of their
employees. 9 At least one-half of the companies testing for breast and colon
cancer risk and Huntington's disease considered the results in their hiring,
3. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, S. 358, 110th Cong. (2007); Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act, H.R. 493, 110th Cong. (2007).
4. Mark A. Rothstein, Genetics and the Work Force of the Next Hundred Years, 2000
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 371, 390 (2000).
5. Mark A. Rothstein, Betsy D. Gelb, & Steven G. Craig, Protecting Genetic Privacy
by Permitting Employer Access Only to Job-Related Employee Medical Information: Analy-
sis of a Unique Minnesota Law, 24 AM. J. L. & MED. 399, 401 (1998).
6. Larry Gostin, Genetic Discrimination: The Use of Genetically Based Diagnostic and
Prognostic Tests by Employers and Insurers, 17 AM. J. L. & MED. 109, 111 (1991).
7. Rothstein, supra note 4, at 382-83.
8. AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, AMA 2004 WORKPLACE TESTING SURVEY:
MEDICAL TESTING 2 (2004), http://www.amanet.org/research/pdfs/Medical_testing_04.pdf.
9. Id. Out of 503 responses, 3% of employers test for breast or colon cancer, 0.8% test
for Huntington's disease, 14.7% collect family medical history, and 15.1% test for suscepti-
bility to workplace hazards. Id.
[Vol. 30
GENETIC TESTING & DISCRIMINATION
re-assigning, and firing decisions.' ° One-fifth of the companies use the in-
formation gleaned from family medical histories, and more than one-half
use the information from tests regarding susceptibility to workplace hazards
in their employee decision-making." As the quantity of available tests in-
creases and their costs decline, employers will become even more likely to
use them.
But as genetic testing for asymptomatic health conditions and predis-
positions has become more common, broad consensus is emerging that em-
ployees need safeguards against employers accessing and using workers'
genetic information. 2 In 1997, eighty-five percent of respondents in a na-
tional survey "felt that employers should be prohibited from obtaining in-
formation about an individual's genetic conditions and predispositions."' 3 In
2000, President Clinton signed an executive order to "prohibit discrimina-
tion in federal employment based on genetic information."'' 4 As of August
2004, thirty-two states had passed statutes that limited employers' ability to
require or request genetic information from their employees and prohibited
employers from using such information in making employment decisions. 5
The United States Senate passed the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act in 2003 and 2005, and for the second time an identical bill has been
introduced in the United States House of Representatives.
16
The reasons for limiting employers' access to and use of genetic infor-
mation are numerous. At the most basic level, employees want their privacy
protected. In addition, genetic tests contain inherent uncertainty. In some
cases, such as Huntington's disease, the time and rate at which the disease
10. Id. at 2.
11. Id.
12. See Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Genetic Discrimination: Old Res-
ponses to New Technology, 74 B.U. L. REV. 1, 13 (1994). Epstein argues that employees
should be obliged to disclose at least some genetic predispositions in order to distribute com-
plete information across markets. Id.
13. See Paul Steven Miller, Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 26 J.L. Med. &
Ethics 189, 189 (Fall 1998) (citing S. Armour, Workers Fear Genetic Discrimination, USA
TODAY, Feb. 25, 1998 at 4B). The survey, conducted by the National Center for Genome
Resources, polled 1000 people.
14. Exec. Order No. 13145, 3 C.F.R. 13145 (2000).
15. ROBERT B. LANMAN, OFFICE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY ACTIVITIES, NATIONAL INSTITUTES
OF HEALTH, AN ANALYSIS OF THE ADEQUACY OF CURRENT LAW PROTECTING AGAINST
GENETIC DISCRIMINATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE AND EMPLOYMENT; A REPORT
COMMISSIONED BY THE SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND
SOCIETY ii (2005).
16. The Library of Congress, Thomas, http://thomas.loc.gov. The Senate passed S.1053
on October 14, 2003 with a 95 - 0 vote, and S. 306 on February 17, 2005 by a 98 - 0 vote.
The two bills are identical. H.R. 1227, a bill exactly the same as S. 306, was introduced in the




will manifest itself are uncertain, though its eventual appearance is defi-
nite.17 In other instances, such as breast cancer, the information simply
represents an increased risk of developing a condition; 8 whether the condi-
tion appears at all may depend on multiple factors, such as family history, 9
the age at which the woman had her first full term pregnancy,"° lifestyle,2'
and other still unknown factors.22 Genetic tests can never predict what con-
tributions, advancements, and innovations an employee will make to a com-
pany before any type of condition manifests itself. Workers fear being con-
signed to a limited, unproductive professional life, when in fact they could
have many good years ahead of them. As genetics becomes more closely
linked with behavioral traits, employers may confuse "heritability"-the
ability of a trait to be passed from one person to his or her offspring-with
"immutability"--the ability of the trait to be altered through the environ-
ment, personal effort, or other factors-and make unjustified judgments
regarding employees. Fear of discrimination may keep employees from be-
ing tested even though early detection and treatment could improve and ex-
tend their lives. 23 Allowing employers to make decisions based on characte-
ristics they assume to be an individual's genetic "destiny" would be an un-
desirable outcome of the United States' investment in genetic research and
could diminish the benefits that the research offers.2 Scientists also foresee
difficulty in collecting research data as people become unwilling to submit
to genetic tests.25
III. CURRENT FEDERAL AND STATE PROTECTIONS FOR EMPLOYEES ARE
INADEQUATE
No federal law squarely protecting employees from genetic discrimina-
tion exists. Initially, legal scholars and the Equal Employment Opportunity
17. Sky Dawson et al., Living with Huntington's Disease: Need for Supportive Care,
NURSING & HEALTH Sci., June 2004, at 123-30.
18. Thomas C. Rosenthal & Stirling M. Puck, Screening for Genetic Risk of Breast
Cancer, AM. FAM. PHYsICIAN, Jan. 1, 1999, at 100.
19. Mary-Claire King et al., Breast and Ovarian Cancer Risks Due to Inherited Muta-
tions in BRCA1 and BRCA2, Sci., Oct. 24, 2003, at 645.
20. A. Antoniou et al., Parity and Breast Cancer Risk among BRCA I and BRCA 2
Mutation, Breast Cancer Research 2006:8(6) at 72.
21. King, supra note 19, at 644.
22. A. Antoniou et al., Average Risk of Breast Cancer Associated with BRCA 1 or BRCA
2 Mutations Detected in Case Series Unselectedfor Family History: A Combined Analysis of
Studies, AMER. J. HUM. GENETICS, May 2003 72(5), at 1117-30.
23. Miller, supra note 13, at 190.
24. S. Rep. No. 108-122, at 6 (2003). This report was created with the Genetic Informa-
tion Nondiscrimination Act of 2003, S. 1053, 108th Cong. (2003). Nevertheless, it applies to
S. 306 because the bills are identical.
25. Miller, supra note 13, at 190.
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Commission (EEOC) contended that courts should interpret the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) to prohibit genetic discrimination. 26 Employers
who made decisions based on asymptomatic genetic conditions arguably
"regarded" their employees as disabled.27 The United States Supreme
Court's holding in Bragdon v. Abbott,28 that a woman with asymptomatic
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) was disabled under the ADA because
the virus altered her cellular composition and limited her in the major life
activity of reproduction, supported their interpretation. 29 The case suggested
that ADA coverage extended at least to people whose genetic compositions
affected their reproductive decisions.3"
The Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Sutton v. United Airlines,
inc.,31 however, narrowed the definition of disability and eliminated the pos-
sibility that the ADA applies to people with genetic predispositions.32 The
Sutton court held that a person must be "presently-not potentially or hypo-
thetically-substantially limited" in a major life activity in order to demon-
strate a disability.33 In order to claim that an employer "regarded" them as
disabled, employees had show that the employer believed an employee was
substantially limited in a major life activity at the time the discrimination
occurred.34 An employer's perception that an employee was unsuited for a
particular position was insufficient to show that the employer regarded the
employee as substantially limited in a major life activity. 5
In the case of genetic discrimination, employers are unlikely to regard
their employees as currently unable to perform a job or as substantially li-
mited in their ability to do anything. Rather, employers view their em-
ployees as a future medical risk. In addition, under Sutton, carriers of reces-
sive genes could never receive ADA protection, although they might be
victims of genetic discrimination.
26. E.g., Miller, supra note 13, at 191; UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 902.8(a) (2000).
27. See, e.g., Paul Steven Miller, Is There a Pink Slip in My Genes?, 3 J. HEALTH CARE
L. & POL'Y 225,239-40 (2000).
28. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
29. Id.at637-41.
30. Id. at 638.
31. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
32. Id. at 482.
33. Id. The ADA defines "disability" as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of
such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. §
12102 (2)(A)-(C) (1999).
34. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489.
35. Id. at 490.
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Any protections provided by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196436
are also incomplete. Title VII only applies if genetic testing is used as a pre-
text to discriminate intentionally on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin, or if genetic testing had a disparate impact on one or more of
those groups. 37 The Statute would only provide limited protection: "Many, if
not most, genetically related diseases and disorders do not disproportionate-
ly affect one of Title VII's protected classes."38 For example, the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals found a Title VII violation in Norman-Bloodsaw v.
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory3 9 in which a research center singled out
African-American employees for sickle cell anemia testing and female em-
ployees for pregnancy testing.4" Absent such obvious overlap, Title VII is
unlikely to protect employees.
The patchwork of state laws is also inadequate. Current state laws ad-
dressing genetic discrimination create heightened protection for genetic in-
formation compared to other health data in the workplace and prohibit em-
ployers from using genetic information in making workplace decisions.4
States, however, define genetic information differently, address different
methods of gathering genetic information, and do not provide employees
with equal remedies. Wisconsin, for example, only extends its protections to
information obtained from "tests of a person's genes, gene products or
chromosomes,"42 and limits enforcement to the administrative remedies pro-
vided by the Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, the
state's equivalent of the EEOC. 43 Utah similarly limits its definition of ge-
netic information to information derived from tests, but the state expressly
grants employees a private right of action and the ability to collect punitive
damages if the act is "willful" and "malicious." In contrast, Oklahoma fails
to give employees a private right of action.45 Washington includes informa-
tion derived from family medical histories in its definition of genetic infor-
36. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
37. Miller, supra note 13, at 191.
38. Id.
39. 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998).
40. Id. at 1265, 1272.
41. LANMAN, supra note 15, at 11.
42. WIS. STAT. § 111.32 (7m) (2006).
43. See Nawrocki v. Milwaukee Fire & Police Comm'n, 478 N.W.2d 67 (Wis. Ct. App.
1991) (concluding that the Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations has exclu-
sive power to enforce the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act).
44. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 2645-102, 26-45-105 (2006).
45. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3614.2 (2006) (prohibiting genetic discrimination); see Walk-
er v. Chouteau Lime Co., 849 P.2d 685 (Okla. 1993) (explaining Oklahoma's narrow rule for
finding an implied right of action in a statute).
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mation and probably has an implied right of action.46 As these examples
demonstrate, state laws "vary widely with respect to their approach, applica-
tion, and level of protection.''41 Many people, both within the American pub-
lic and medical community, find state laws inadequate as a result.48
Due to incomplete federal coverage and a patchwork of state laws, pri-
vate sector employees have limited protection from genetic discrimination.
Companies operating across state lines face the burden of complying with a
variety of laws. A federal law specifically addressing genetic discrimination
in the workplace would establish a national uniform standard.49 Employees
would have comprehensive protections no matter where they lived, and em-
ployers would have consistent standards to follow no matter where they
operated.
IV. OPTIMAL CHARACTERISTICS OF A FEDERAL LAW
Once the need for a federal law has been established, the next question
is what protections the law should provide. In order to accomplish its goal of
preventing genetic information from being used in employment decisions,
the law should (1) recognize that scientific knowledge of the human genome
is rapidly changing, (2) apply broadly to the employment sector, (3) give
genetic information heightened privacy protections, and (4) consider its inte-
raction with other federal and state laws. Current state laws prohibiting ge-
netic discrimination, federal employment laws such as the ADA and Title
VII, and the unique nature of genetic information suggests a number of cha-
racteristics that are necessary for a federal law to succeed.
A. The Law Cannot Be Disease Specific
Early state laws forbidding employers from genetic testing and dis-
crimination applied to specific diseases. New Jersey, for example, until it
changed its law in 1996, prohibited discrimination against people with sickle
cell, hemoglobin C, thalassemia, Tay-Sachs, or cystic fibrosis traits.5" As all
the states with genetic discrimination statutes have recognized, knowledge
about genetic links to disease is changing rapidly, and current laws cannot
be limited to genetic markers for specific diseases. Otherwise, the law would
need amending frequently and be too narrow in its scope.
46. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.180 (2006); see Bennett v. Hardy, 784 P.2d 1258, 1261-
62 (Wash. 1990) (explaining test for finding implied right of action in state statutes).
47. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2005, H.R. 1227, 109th Cong. § 2(5)
(2005).
48. Id.
49. LANMAN, supra note 15, at ii.
50. Rothstein, supra note 5, at 402 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(y)-(cc) (1995)).
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B. The Law Must Cover Current Employees and Applicants, Including
People that Have Received a Job Offer but Have Not Yet Started
Working
The purpose of any legislation must be to prohibit employers from us-
ing genetic information to make employment decisions. To effectuate that
purpose, legislation must extend not only to employees, but also to job ap-
plicants and employees who have received an offer but have not started
working. If the law does not provide this coverage, employees who have
already been victims of genetic discrimination and lost their job will have an
increased danger of receiving discriminatory treatment again. In addition,
not extending protection to job applicants could speed up the creation of a
"genetic underclass" by preventing people with genetic predispositions from
entering the workforce. Other anti-discrimination statutes, such as Title VII,
recognize that protecting current employees is insufficient and apply to job
applicants as well." State legislation prohibiting genetic discrimination also
extends to job applicants or people who have received job offers but have
not started working.5 2 Any federal law must be as comprehensive as possible
and cover applicants in all stages of the hiring process, as well as current
employees.
C. The Law Should Apply to Labor Organizations, Employment Agen-
cies, and Licensing Agencies
Utah and Virginia are two states that prohibit genetic discrimination by
employers but do not make the same requirements of labor organizations
and licensing agencies. 3 As with excluding job applicants, this gap under-
mines the purpose of those states' statutes. For many professions, member-
ship in a labor organization, placement through an agency, or a professional
license is essential to obtaining employment. In these cases, the organization
or agency is acting as the de facto hiring person by standing in the employ-
er's shoes. With this loophole, employers could manufacture a "recommen-
dation process" and essentially outsource hiring, allowing these organiza-
tions to screen out the genetically undesirable before they ever reach the
employer's doorstep. Even if employers are not premeditating a screening-
out process, labor organizations and employment agencies have an econom-
ic interest in offering employers physically fit workers. Taken to the ex-
treme, these entities could offer "Genetically tested and fit employees, guar-
51. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
52. E.g., TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 21.402 (Vemon 2006).
53. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 26-45-103, 34A-2-103 (2006); VA. CODE. ANN. §§ 40.1-28.7:1,
40.1-2 (2006).
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anteed!" Licensing organizations, such as state bar associations, present a
similar risk. A federal law must broadly define the term "employer" in order
to create adequate protections for workers.
D. The Law Should Apply to Employers Acting as Self-insurers
Employers who do not purchase health insurance from a provider, but
instead self-insure, present another potential loophole. A self-insured em-
ployer could circumvent anti-discrimination principles by claiming that they
were underwriting risks, rather than making employment decisions, if they
took adverse action against employees based on genetic information.54 Al-
though most states have laws providing some protection against genetic
discrimination by health insurers, these laws do not always extend to self-
insured employers. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) preempts state laws that "relate to any employee benefit plans,"
except state laws regulating insurance." State insurance laws do not always
cover employers who self-insure. 6 They must comply with the Health In-
surance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), which prohibits insur-
ance plans from using genetic information to determine insurance eligibility,
rates, continuing coverage, and pre-existing health conditions, but HIPAA
does not provide any heightened privacy protections for genetic informa-
tion.57
Because state laws prohibiting genetic discrimination in insurance are
even more of a patchwork than the current state laws prohibiting genetic
discrimination in employment, and because protections provided by HIPAA
and ERISA are insufficient, employment anti-discrimination legislation
should apply to employers in their underwriting capacities. For these em-
ployers, hiring and firing decisions are closely linked with insurance cover-
age.
E. The Definition of "Genetic Information" Should Include Information
Obtained from Family Medical Histories
Only a limited number of states include data obtained from family
medical histories in their definition of "genetic information."8 Again, the
54. Gostin, supra note 6, at 134.
55. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), (b)(A)(2) (2006); see Gostin, supra note 6, at n.146, n.159.
56. Gostin, supra note 6, at n.159.
57. Karen Rothenburg, et al., Genetic Information and the Workplace: Legislative
Approaches and Policy Challenges, 275 Sci. 1755, 1756 (1997).
58. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.180 (2006) (providing that genetic information
includes information stemming from family history); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-45-102 (7)(a)(ii)
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purpose of any genetic discrimination statute is to prevent employers from
making decisions based on the genetic predispositions of employees. The
source of the information is irrelevant to the nature of the information and
the ways in which employers use it. A family medical history can be just as
revealing as a DNA test. An employer does not need a laboratory test to
realize that a person with a parent who suffers from Huntington's disease or
with siblings who have sickle cell anemia is at risk for those diseases. By
excluding knowledge obtained from family medical histories in its definition
of "genetic information," a statute would significantly weaken its ability to
protect employees.
F. The Law Should Prohibit Employers From Requesting and Collecting
Genetic Information, Except in Limited Circumstances
The best way to prevent adverse employment actions stemming from
genetic information is to prevent employers from obtaining genetic informa-
tion about their employees. Also, prohibiting employers from requesting
genetic information will allay employees' fears that employers are using
such information against them. Such a blanket prohibition in a federal law,
however, would reach too broadly.
To avoid unduly burdening employers, the rule should have a few well-
circumscribed exceptions. For example, employers should be able to offer
genetic services as part of a bona fide wellness program, and they may need
to request genetic information in order to comply with other laws, such as
the Family and Medical Leave Act.5 9 Nor should employers be penalized for
the inadvertent collection of genetic information through casual conversa-
tion.
The most important exception should be for genetic monitoring. Em-
ployees' and employers' interests in genetic information shift in hazardous
workplaces. Genetic monitoring occurs when employers periodically ex-
amine employees to evaluate acquired modifications to their genetic materi-
al, such as chromosomal damage or evidence of increased occurrence of
mutations, that may have developed in the course of employment due to
exposure to toxic substances in the workplace.6" Genetic monitoring seeks to
control or to identify, evaluate, and respond to the effects of adverse envi-
ronmental exposures in the workplace.6 Employees have an increased inter-
est in obtaining information about their genetic composition in hazardous
workplaces in order to monitor their health closely and make an informed
(2006) (providing that genetic information does include information derived from family
medical history).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 2613 (2006).
60. H.R. 1227, 109th Cong. § 201 (2005).
61. Id.
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decision about remaining at their job. For example, genetic information can
provide information to workers regarding chromosomal damage caused by
exposure to asbestos, chromium, nickel, and vinyl chloride. Workers who
have the genes for alpha-i -antitrypsin deficiency have an increased risk of
developing emphysema if they work in dust-producing jobs.62 Employers in
hazardous workplaces have more stringent regulations governing occupa-
tional safety than those running non-hazardous workplaces, and they have a
right to require employees to undertake medical examinations to fulfill their
duty to maintain a safe workplace. 63 The information obtained from genetic
monitoring is also important for furthering occupational disease research.
In a survey of eleven states, only one had a clear exception for request-
ing or requiring genetic information in the case of genetic monitoring; two
states had an implied exception; and eight states prohibited all requests for
genetic tests.64 Because the use of genetic monitoring in hazardous
workplaces can give employees important health information, assist research
in occupational diseases, and potentially help employers meet their safety
obligations, a genetic discrimination law should provide an exception for
employers who are using the information to monitor the biological effects of
toxic substances in the workplace. The exception should contain protections
for workers, including a requirement that employees provide voluntary,
written, and informed consent or that the testing be required by state or fed-
eral law. Monitoring must also comply with federal and state regulations.
G. The Law Should Provide Heightened Privacy Protections for Genetic
Information, Especially in the Case of Genetic Monitoring
Like an HIV diagnosis, genetic information is very sensitive: it reveals
that an asymptomatic worker will later suffer from a serious illness or has a
greater likelihood than others of developing certain diseases; the information
usually affects the person throughout her life, unlike a transient illness; and
once such information is disclosed, it can stigmatize the individual and lead
to adverse decisions throughout a lifetime in many different contexts.65 For
62. Lori B. Andrews & Ami S. Jaeger, Confidentiality of Genetic Information in the
Workplace, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 75, 76 (1991).
63. Id. (citing OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, UNITED STATES CONG., GENETIC
MONITORING AND SCREENING IN THE WORKPLACE 130 (1990)).
64. Wisconsin has an express genetic monitoring exception. WIs. STAT. § 111.372
(2006). Texas and Utah have an implied genetic monitoring exception. TEx. LAB. § 21.401
(2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-45-102 (2006). The states prohibiting all requests for genetic
information are Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, and
Washington. NEV. REV. STAT. 613.345 (2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 14.2 (2006); OR. REV.
STAT. § 659A.303 (2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.7-1 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-2-20
(2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9332 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.180 (2006).
65. Andrews & Jaeger, supra note 62, at 77.
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these reasons, genetic information in medical records should receive heigh-
tened protection.
To help avoid both deliberate and inadvertent disclosure, genetic in-
formation should be maintained separately and disclosed only with indepen-
dent authorization. Employers often ask for blanket access to medical
records. These requests should not include access to genetic information.
Instead, the law should require a separate request for genetic information.
Employers subpoenaing medical records should also have to include a spe-
cial request for genetic information before it will be released.
If employees do consent to the release of genetic information, their
consent should be construed narrowly. Some states have already passed leg-
islation following this precept. Texas, for example, prohibits disclosure of
genetic information, by subpoena or otherwise, except in a few circums-
tances such as to establish paternity and identify remains, unless the indi-
vidual specifically authorizes the disclosure.66 The individual maintains his
or her privacy interest even after disclosure to one party because the statute
expressly prohibits "a redisclosure of genetic information by a secondary
recipient of the information after disclosure of the information by an initial
recipient.
' 61
Additional safeguards are necessary in workplaces conducting genetic
monitoring. In these circumstances, the physicians conducting the testing
should release the results to individual employees upon their request, and
employers should receive only aggregate, anonymous results. Traditionally,
occupational physicians hired by employers or employers' workers' com-
pensation insurers were not in a physician-patient relationship with em-
ployees. Their clients were the employers, not the workers.68 Consequently,
the physicians' duty to disclose to the worker was lessened, and their ability
to disclose information to the employer was heightened. Recently, that rigid
rule has been relaxed, especially when the physician is providing care and
treatment beyond testing.69 The rule should be expressly overturned in the
situation of genetic monitoring. This change would comport with the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), which gives employees in hazard-
ous workplaces the right to see the medical records that their employer
maintains.7° Also, because genetic test results are difficult for lay people to
interpret, results should include a referral to a genetic counselor. OSHA
already contains a similar provision in its benzene standard, which requires
66. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.403(b) (Vernon 2006).
67. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.403, 21.4031 (Vernon 2006).
68. Andrews & Jaeger, supra note 62, at 88.
69. Id. at 89.
70. Id. at 91 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1910.20 (1990)).
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referral to a hematologist for further evaluation if the employee's test con-
tains certain results.7
Employers engaging in genetic monitoring also need to take precau-
tions to protect employee confidentiality. For example, employees should be
able to request the means of delivery, whether by mail, in person, or in a
confidential memorandum, and all employees should undergo tests with the
same frequency. These practices are particularly important in small busi-
nesses, where other employees can easily spot an employee singled out for
additional testing or receiving additional information.72
Finally, an employee's consent to release results should be narrowly
construed in genetic monitoring situations. The default rule should be that
employers receive only aggregate, anonymous information rather than indi-
vidually identified test results. An employee's consent to take the test should
not imply consent to release the results to the employer. In addition, the law
should establish a wall between scientific researchers, who may need indivi-
dually identified results, and employers.
Of eleven states surveyed, none provide protection for genetic informa-
tion beyond that given to ordinary medical records.73 Supplying additional
safeguards will reduce the risk that employers will misuse genetic informa-
tion while still allowing its collection for important purposes, such as genet-
ic monitoring and Family and Medical Leave Act compliance. Requiring
specific consent from employees before releasing genetic information will
make employees more aware that their genetic information is available and
help them protect the confidentiality of their medical records.
H. The Law Should Have a Dual Enforcement Mechanism, Including a
Private Right of Action that Applies to the Illegal Collection of Genet-
ic Information, Not Just Adverse Employment Actions
One of the greatest challenges facing genetic discrimination laws is en-
forcement. For employees, proving an employer acted against them on the
basis of genetic information will be exceedingly difficult. Although numer-
ous states allow for a private right of action in instances of genetic discrimi-
nation, no employee has brought an action alleging genetic discrimination
under state law. One case filed by the EEOC against Burlington Northern
Santa Fe Railroad settled before reaching trial.74 According to former EEOC
Commissioner Paul Miller, disclosure of the alleged unauthorized genetic
71. Id. at 92 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1028 & Appendix C (1990)).
72. Id. at 92.
73. The states studied are Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
74. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., No.
02-C-0456, 2002 WL 32155386 (E.D. Wis. 2002).
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testing was happenstance.75 The absence of complaints suggests either that
genetic discrimination is not occurring or that evidence of it is too sparse to
enable employees to gather sufficient knowledge and evidence of its occur-
rence. Employers' willingness to test employees for sickle cell anemia be-
ginning in the 1970S76 and the rapidly growing availability of genetic tests
suggest that the latter possibility-that evidence of genetic discrimination is
too sparse-is more likely. The difficulty in establishing the link between
the knowledge and the action creates two issues. First, employers do not
want their possession of genetic information to create a presumption of dis-
crimination in the case of an employee experiencing an adverse employment
action. Second, employees are afraid that they will be left fruitlessly trying
to string together circumstantial evidence and will never be able to over-
come their burden of proof.
The law should have a dual enforcement mechanism. Employers
should be subject to civil penalties for unauthorized collection, disclosure,
and use of genetic information. The EEOC would be well-suited to enforce
these penalties because it has comprehensive experience in interpreting and
enforcing employment laws.
The most important enforcement step is to create a private right of ac-
tion. As in other anti-discrimination statutes such as Title IX and Title VII,
private rights of action empower the people closest to the facts and most
familiar with the circumstances to take action.77 The private right of action
must include the ability to be awarded attorneys' fees to enable potential
plaintiffs to hire professional assistance. It must extend to violations of the
provisions prohibiting collection of genetic information and requests for
genetic tests, not just adverse employment actions. Not only will proof be
easier in these situations, the most effective way to prevent adverse em-
ployment actions on the basis of genetic information is to deter and prevent
employers from obtaining genetic information at the outset.
V. CURRENT PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION HAS MANY DESIRABLE
CHARACTERISTICS BUT NEEDS SOME CHANGES
In 2007, the Senate introduced Senate Bill 358, The Genetic Nondi-
scrimination Act of 2007.78 This bill is identical to the 2005 version, which
passed by a vote of ninety-eight to zero. An identical version is pending for
75. Interview with Paul Steven Miller, Professor, Univ. of Wash. School of Law, in
Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 22, 2006).
76. See, e.g., Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir.
1998).
77. Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006); Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
78. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2007, S. 358, 110th Cong. (2007).
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the second time in the House.79 The Bill outlaws discrimination based on
genetic information in both insurance and employment.
Title II, the section of the Bill covering employment, has many of the
characteristics described above for the model federal statute. It covers pri-
vate sector employers with more than fifteen employees, some federal gov-
ernment employees, employment agencies, labor organizations and their
members, job applicants, and workers in job training programs.80 The Bill
does not, however, apply to licensing organizations. Ideally, a federal law
should apply to all private sector employers; nevertheless, civil rights sta-
tutes in the United States have traditionally been limited to employers with
more than fifteen employees because including all small businesses is politi-
cally unfeasible. 81 At the very least, the Bill should extend to licensing or-
ganizations.
The proposed legislation does contain many important protections for
employees. Employers are not allowed to make employment decisions based
on an employee's genetic information, an employee's request for genetic
services, or an employee's receipt of "genetic services,"82 which include
"genetic tests," "genetic counseling," and "genetic education., 83 Important-
ly, the definition of "genetic information" includes information obtained
from family medical histories.8 4 Employers also may not use their em-
ployees' genetic information, request for genetic tests, or receipt of genetic
services to classify employees in any way that would deprive or tend to de-
prive employees of employment opportunities or adversely affect their em-
85ployment status.
Significantly, the proposed Bill also forbids employers to request, re-
quire, or purchase genetic information about an employee or employee's
family members.86 This prohibition has a few limited exceptions. Employers
do not engage in an unlawful employment practice if they inadvertently re-
quest or require family medical history of an employee; offer genetic servic-
es as part of a "bona fide wellness program" and never receive individually
identifiable genetic information about their employees; request family medi-
cal history information to comply with the Family Medical Leave Act; pur-
chase commercially and publicly available documents that include family
79. Because they are all identical, the bills will hereinafter be referred to as the "Bill."
80. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2005, S. 306, 109th Cong. § 201
(2005).
81. See, e.g., Section 701(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
(2006).
82. S. 306, § 202.
83. Id. § 201.
84. Id. ("genetic information" means information about "the occurrence of a disease or
disorder in family members of the individual").




medical history; or engage in genetic monitoring and never receive indivi-
dually identifiable information. 7 The exception for inadvertent requests of
family medical history is meant to address the "water cooler" problem, in
which an employer unintentionally learns about the medical condition of an
employee's family members through casual conversation.8 ' The exception
for publicly available documents exists to protect employers who self-insure
and inadvertently acquire genetic information.89 Nonetheless, these employ-
ers are still prevented from using the information in their employment deci-
sions.
The Bill also addresses genetic monitoring. It defines genetic monitor-
ing as the "periodic examination of employees to evaluate acquired modifi-
cations to their genetic material ... that may have developed ... due to ex-
posure to toxic substances in the workplace, in order to identify, evaluate,
and respond to the effects of or control adverse environmental exposures in
the workplace."9 ° Employers who engage in genetic monitoring must give
employees written notice of the practice and receive the employees' in-
formed consent to conduct the test, unless the law requires testing, in which
case the employee's consent is not necessary, although written notice is still
required.91 Employers must inform employees of their individual monitoring
results, and monitoring must comply with federal and state regulations.92
Finally, the employer can only receive the results of the monitoring in ag-
gregate terms that do not disclose the identities of specific employees.93 An
employer can never use any of the information acquired through genetic
monitoring to make an adverse employment decision regarding an individu-
al employee. 94 These provisions serve to enable genetic monitoring while
providing important protections for employees.
The Bill gives heightened protection to genetic information. It requires
employers who have genetic information, or information about requests for
and receipt of genetic services, to maintain the information "on separate
forms and in separate medical files and be treated as a confidential medical
record of the employee." 95 The Bill also strictly prohibits disclosing the in-
formation except to the employee at the employee's request to a researcher
if the research is conducted according to federal regulations, to government
officials investigating compliance with the Bill, for Family and Medical
87. Id.
88. S. Rep. 108-122, supra note 24.
89. Interview with Paul Steven Miller, supra note 75.
90. S. 306, supra note 67, § 201.




95. Id. § 206; 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006).
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Leave Act purposes, or in response to a court order. In the case of court or-
ders, the Bill carefully limits the disclosure to the information expressly
authorized in the order, and employers must tell the relevant employee in
enough time to give the employee adequate notice to challenge the order if it
was secured without the employee's knowledge.96
Finally, the Bill allows enforcement by the EEOC and creates a private
right of enforcement. It provides private plaintiffs with the same remedies
offered in Title VII, defined in 42 U.S.C § 1981a. If employees prove a vi-
olation, they can receive attorneys' fees and costs, plus punitive and com-
pensatory damages up to $300,000. 9'
VI. CONCLUSION
Genetic discrimination is a real possibility and a real fear in American
workplaces. A federal law must provide comprehensive and uniform protec-
tions for workers and include necessary exceptions currently ignored by
many state laws. The current proposed federal legislation incorporates many
of the protections and exceptions necessary to create a thorough, fair, and
effective genetic nondiscrimination law. Nevertheless, the Bill fails to in-
clude certain necessary protections and may not sufficiently anticipate future
developments in genetic testing. Because the Bill is relatively close to pass-
ing, lawmakers should keep the Bill in its current form and eliminate its
weaknesses by amending it in subsequent Congressional sessions. This ap-
proach offers the greatest likelihood of giving American workers the protec-
tions they need as soon as possible.
96. S. 306, supra note 67, § 206.
97. However, there is no cause of action for disparate impact. Id. § 208.
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